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The Rising Digital Missile Gap:  
 





In 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy campaigned on the issue that under the watch of President 
Eisenhower, a missile gap had develop between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fear 
of nuclear war was a grim reality, which most politicians and citizens alike understood the dire 
consequences. Policymakers witnessed the devastation of atomic weapons in the wake of World 
War II. The vaporization of two Japanese cities, awoken the world to the power of nuclear 
weapons. In efforts to prevent the duplications of these disasters, policymakers committed 
themselves to the mastery of space, international treaties, and the development of defensive 
measures and alert systems. While the threat of nuclear weapons is far from over, policy makers 
understood the severity of these weapons, the consequences of their use, and worked to prevent 
annihilation. The arms race was a key component of the deterrence strategy which defined 
defense policy in that era. It rested on the principle that the Soviet Union should not develop 
technological superiority over the United States. The belief was that should a missile gap 
develop and the Soviet Union was to gain more weapons then the United States, America would 
be doomed in nuclear holocaust. A competing viewpoint was held by the Soviet Union which 
feared the American’s nuclear superiority as well.  
We stand at the threshold of developing a new arms race -- one represented no longer by 
a gap of nuclear warheads, but a gap in digital supremacy. The world is evolving into a 
dangerous new world, with stakes higher than ever. Perhaps since policymakers have never 
witnessed the devastation of a large scale cyber-attack, they do not truly understand the serious 




threat which a cyber-attack presents. The United States’ failure both to dominate the electro-
magnetic spectrum for military purposes, the failure to secure our digital infrastructure, in wake 
of the rapid cyber development of other nations, presents the most immediate threat to national 
security. We are only as safe as we allow ourselves to be, and we need to act quickly to begin 
removing the vulnerabilities within our computer systems. It only takes one successful hacker, to 
end the way of life in America we know. The National Nuclear Security Administration, which 
oversees the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile, is attacked nearly 10 million times a day (Koebler, 
2012). In an ever grimmer reality, one successful attack could end all life on earth. Is this a risk 
we are willing to take? National Security depends upon cyber-security. 
One of the best examples of this of the threats of society comes from August 2008, 
during the South Ossetia war between Russia and Georgia. During the military campaign in 
Georgia, Russian naval hackers methodically launched cyber-attacks on Georgia (Bukkvol, 
2009). These hackers destroyed Georgian internet servers crippling and disrupting 
communication throughout Georgia (Walsh, 2009). The Georgian government could not match 
the technical superiority of Russia, and was forced to rely upon Estonia and Poland for technical 
assistance (Markoff, 2008). The Russian Naval hackers then infiltrated the Georgian Power grid; 
block by block they powered down cities as Russian ground forces moved in for occupation.  
Russia is not the only nation to demonstrate such capabilities. The United States began 
flexing its own cyber-muscle during the Bush Administration. Late in 2007, the National 
Security Agency (NSA) launched one of the largest and most successful cyber-attacks to date 
(Harris, 2009). The NSA attacked cell phones and computers that counter insurgents in Iraq were 
using to plan and coordinate roadside bombings (Harris, 2009). This operation was not only a 




successful military strike on enemy forces, but it was successfully achieved without risking the 
safety of American personnel.  
While cyber-warfare is still secondary to traditional warfare, there are graver threats 
lurking in cyberspace. Cyber-spying is one of these prominent threats. In an incident referred to 
by the Defense Department as “moonlight mazes”, hackers traced to Russia were found to have 
infiltrated the Defense Department’s network in an attempt to steal military secrets (Vistca, 
1999). Terabytes worth of data were stolen on the development of Lockheed Martin’s 
revolutionary Joint Strike Fighter (Sweetman, 2009). Due to the complexity of the project, and 
the involvement of thousands of personnel, information was transmitted and stored electronically 
over public networks so all necessary personnel could access it (Sweetman, 2009). While it 
would have been safer to use a specialized network for this project, it was not practical or 
possible. Once the network was compromised, it became vulnerable to repeated attacks 
(Sweetman, 2009). 
Combating cyber-spies can be more challenging than their cold war counterparts, as all 
the secured hangers, sealed buildings, and secret bunkers in the world cannot keep cyber-spies 
from accessing information in the same ways they could prevent traditional spying methods 
(Sweetman, 2009). The cyber-spies do not simply steal information, as did spies of the past, but 
copy it (Sweetman, 2009). For this reason, these acts of espionage are more difficult to detect. 
Nothing is broken, nothing is missing, nothing is stolen, so it is exceedingly difficult to tell when 
something has been compromised (Sweetman, 2009). The other difficulty with cyber-spies is that 
while it is suspected that most hackers work for foreign governments, it is impossible to prove 
(Wright, 2009). The fact that the IP address of a computer used in a cyber-attack is located in a 
foreign country is not indisputable evidence of a foreign government’s involvement. The recent 




attack on the South Korean banking and broadcast systems is evidence of this (China, 2013). 
Though the attacks appeared to have originated in China, it is suspected that they were initiated 
by North Korean Hackers masking their point of origin (China, 2013). 
In recent years there has been a significant increase in the frequency of attacks on 
military, governmental, and civilian computers from both governments and independent hackers 
(Walsh, 39). In June of 2007, fifteen hundred of the Department of Defense’s computers were 
taken offline after a cyber-attack (Fox, 2007). The Department of Homeland Security reported 
roughly eight hundred successful attacks in a two month window surrounding the same period of 
time (Fox, 2007). The Pentagon itself is attacked roughly one hundred times a day. These attacks 
are separate from the attacks on Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the NSA, the CIA, 
and the other government agencies responsible for National Security (Miklaszewski, 1999). The 
Air Force estimates that roughly ten terabytes of top secret data have been stolen from Defense 
computer systems by hackers within a two year period (Wright, 2009).  
What makes this new digital arms race different from the past is the fact that the players 
in this race are no longer only nation states, but terrorist organizations, hacker groups, and 
teenagers in basements. There are instances when novice hackers have been responsible for 
stealing information and compromising systems in an attempt to prove simply test, or prove 
capabilities (Wright, 2009). Computer hackers can come from anywhere, and possess the power 
to steal secrets and launch attacks against secure networks. 
Terrorists are now going high-tech and finding unique uses for cyberspace, such as the 
recruitment of new members. Salman Al-Awdah, a friend of Osama bin Laden and one of the 
early founders of radicalism against the United States, uses his website to spread his ideology to 
the next generation of jihadists (Belz, 2009). Terrorist organizations have used Google Earth to 




plan attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (Rollins, 2007). Once these attacks 
were coordinated and executed, videos depicting the violence were then posted online (Harris, 
2009). Terror cells use popular games, such as Second Life and World of Warcraft to plan 
meetings (O'Brien, 2007). In these virtual worlds terrorist can meet via avatars, digital 
manifestations of themselves existing online. These meetings can involve participants from all 
around the world and, shrouded in the cover of game play, are virtually undetectable. Meetings 
conducted in game provide secrecy and security they could never experience if they were to 
occur in the physical world, as these virtual environments cannot be monitored by traditional 
surveillance techniques (Rollins, 2007). 
Terrorist groups have created thousands of websites to fundraise, recruit, and educate 
(Rollins, 2007). Al Qaeda has created websites with gigabytes full of information educating 
potential terrorist on everything from building safe houses to planning suicide bombings. They 
even teach how to mix lethal chemicals and what to do if captured (Rollins, 2007). Such groups 
now educate new recruits on computer hacking techniques in order to prepare them for the 
coming “electronic jihad” (Rollins, 2007).  What might this electronic Jihad look like? It is 
possible that it could look something like attacks on power grids, which have resulted in 
widespread power outages (Gorman, 2009). It could be far more advance than that though, an 
attack on power systems could involve the reversal of water filtration, the blocking of oil 
pipelines, the jamming of communications, and the crippling of transportation systems -- all the 
makings of a manmade national disaster (Shea, 2004). 
Despite attacks like this, U.S. infrastructure remains vulnerable to attack; since the 
industrial control systems are ridden with vulnerabilities and the security of these systems has 
been a low priority (Shea, 2004). The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 




systems are the computer systems responsible for monitoring infrastructure and communication 
systems within the United States. The SCADA systems operate everything from cellphone 
towers to electricity, and water treatment to traffic lights. Interestingly enough, an al Qaeda 
computer was discovered in Afghanistan containing detailed analysis of SCADA systems within 
the United States (Shea, 2004). While the SCADA systems are protected systems, the 
consequences would be dire if any part of the system were to be compromised. While some 
professionals feel that the chances of success of an attack on these systems would be rather 
minimal given the procedures already in place for naturally occurring system failures, this is not 
the consensus (Shea, 2004). Following an attack, no one knows for how long the systems would 
be compromised. If multiple systems were attacked at once, a cyber-attack on the United States’ 
infrastructure could be more devastating to the nation then any sort of bombing or traditional 
attack. For this reason alone national security is increasingly relying upon cyber-security.  
In November of 2012, Defense Secretary Panetta warned about the severity of the coming 
“Digital Pearl Harbor” (Bemiller & Shanker, 2012). Whether this will come from independent 
hackers, a terrorist organization, or other nations; precautionary measures need to be taken. The 
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, has argued that the threat of a large scale 
cyber-attack is marginal, as Nations like Russia and China – those most capable of launching 
successful large-scale attacks – seem uninterested in attacking the United States (Zetter, 2013). 
Clapper argues that massive attacks will most like occur only in conjunction with military 
conflict between capable nations and the United States (Zetter, 2013). Clapper did warn of 
potential cyber-attacks from smaller actors, who will likely attack smaller systems such as power 
grids (Zetter, 2013). These attacks he argues could have “significant outcomes,” such as 
unexpected consequences or effects form the attacks affecting additional systems (Zetter, 2013). 




Looking towards the future, the United States Air Force committed itself to building a 
force capable of dominating cyberspace, and protecting the country from all cyber-attacks 
(Theohary, 2009). The U.S. Strategic Command -- the unified military command responsible for 
overseeing intelligence, missile defense, and combating weapons of mass destruction -- added to 
its list of responsibilities information warfare, overseeing electronic warfare, and conducting 
information operations (Theohary, 2009). One problem, however, is that current Air Force and 
Department of Defense protocol emphasizes cyber training as opposed to a cyber-education 
(Williams, 2009). Defense personal are only trained to deal with a limited range of scenarios 
(Williams, 2009). This is not a practical strategy for defeating an educated enemy. Such a system 
is inferior to a cyber-education program, which would allow personnel to do more than just react, 
but would enable them to better defend against and implement cyber-attacks. While the Air 
Force expressed its intentions for developing a program capable of defending against all threats 
across the electromagnetic spectrum, it is estimated that a successful cyber-warrior education 
program could take approximately fifteen years to become fully functional (Williams, 2009). 
Another part of the problem with waging cyber-warfare is that most military commanders 
were raised prior to the digital age. Consequently, they have a great deal of trouble 
understanding and utilizing non-traditional methods of warfare (Harris, 2009). For this reason, 
the U.S. military has found adapting to the new digital world a challenge. The U.S has been slow 
in not only repelling cyber-attacks, but also initiating them. General David Petraeus was one of 
the first in the military to actively embrace the power of cyber-space (Harris, 2009). Under 
Petraeus’ command, the United States began shutting down computer servers and hijacking 
phone systems as a part of military information operations (Harris, 2009). Cyber-security is not 
just the responsibility of the Defense Department. The security of the digital infrastructure is 




dependent upon the involvement of other government agencies and the civilian computer 
systems, which makes the collaboration with Congress essential. Congress can take actions such 
as requiring the Intelligence Community to produce reports on current and potential cyber-threats 
(Theohary & Rollins, 2009). Congress should also use its legislative role to determine which 
entity should hold the government’s primary cyber-security responsibilities (Henning & Rollins, 
2009). In addition, Congress can create civil liberty and privacy regulations for consideration 
when implementing further cyber-security reform (Henning & Rollins, 2009). Congress also has 
the power to address comprehensive network security reform (Henning & Rollins, 2009). 
Congress introduced a number of bills on the Hill to bolster digital defenses. These are 
aimed at either heightening security standards or implementing preventative measures. These 
include the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act (H.R. 2200), which 
requires the TSA to rank the cyber risk’s associated with different modes of transportation across 
America (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). Both HR 2165, the Bulk Power Systems Protection Act, 
and HR 2195, designed to amend the existing Federal Power Act, were drafted to prevent cyber-
attacks on the national energy grid (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). The Continuing Chemical 
Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act (HR 2868) would have changed the standards of digital 
security on all Chemical facilities (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). The Cyber-security Act of 2009 
(S. 773) proposed in the Senate would have created regional cyber centers to implement cyber-
security standards and help implement them at state and local levels (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). 
The FEMA Independence Act (HR 1174) would have created a division of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency solely responsible for handling cyber-attacks, and the Cyber-
security Education Enhancement Act (HR 266) was designed to establish a cyber-security 
professional development program (Theohary & Rollins, 2009). While no single piece of the 




legislation is enough to overhaul the national digital infrastructure, each represents a formidable 
start at finding a solution. Unfortunately, all of these bills failed to become law. 
It seems that one of the biggest issues contributing to the continuation of this problem is 
the lack of leadership, with neither the legislative or executive branch taking the lead. This is 
surprising, as President Obama himself was a victim of cyber-attacks while on the campaign trail 
(Obama, 2009). The President stated that “some of the most serious economic and national 
challenges we face as a nation” are weaknesses in our digital infrastructure, and that maintaining 
a technological advantage is the key to military success in the future” (Obama, 2009). The 
President outlined a number of steps to improve cyber-security. These plans included increasing 
public awareness through safety and education campaigns, attracting and retaining federal 
employees with expertise in cyber-security, and increasing partnerships between the private 
sector, the government, the academic world, and civil liberty groups to establish a secure and 
thriving digital infrastructure (Cyber-security, 2009).  
While the Administration did conduct a review of the government’s efforts at “defending 
the information and communication infrastructure” and appointed a cyber-czar as the President 
planned to, it does not seem to have done much more (Obama, 2009). Now entering a second 
term, the Obama Administration’s official plans for improving cyber-security can be found on 
the White House’s website. Two goals are identified: improving Americans resilience to attacks 
and improving and reducing threats (National Security Council). The achievement of these goals 
is outlined in a ten step plan, which includes everything from the appointment of an official to 
coordinate national policy, updating the national security strategies, establishing performance 
parameters to measure national performance, preparing an incident response plan, and 
implementing awareness and education campaigns to promote security (National Security 




Council). The same vague rhetoric and lack of direction which characterized the President’s 
plans when he first entered office still continues to dominate the White House’s current plans. 
However, all the blame cannot be placed on the Obama Administration.  This same lack 
of interest, and leadership, plagued the Executive Branch in their approach towards cyber-space 
since the emergence of the Internet. In 1996, military delegations from both Russia and the 
United States secretly met in Moscow to discuss a treaty that would dictate policy and approach 
towards cyberspace, as both nations realized the infinite potential of these new technologies 
(Markoff, 2009). The Russian’s took this matter very seriously, and appointed a four-star 
Admiral to lead their delegation, the Clinton Administration sent a college professor (Markoff, 
2009). While the professor was an expert in his field, this illustrates the lack of serious 
commitment from the military and White House regarding cyber-space. Their attitude resulted in 
insufficient policy creation. One possibility for the continued lack of tangible results is that the 
Federal Government lacks a starting point for creating cyber-security reform. 
Since writing of this article began, further developments arose in cyber-security, which 
encouraged the President to issue an executive order to improve cyber-security (Obama, 2013). 
Under this new executive order, the President recommitted the government to evaluating the 
most critical infrastructure threats (Obama, 2013). The Department of Justice, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Office of National Intelligence are now committed to greater 
information sharing regarding cyber-security (Obama, 2013). The federal government will begin 
developing cross government minimum standards of cyber-security (Obama, 2013). While this is 
an important move in the right direction, it is not enough. The President himself has realized this, 
and asked Congress in his state of the union address to begin taking the next step to further 
secure our digital infrastructure (Transcript, 2013). 




When moving forward in further evaluating the threats of cyber-space, the United State 
should mimic the example of Russia. While Russian policies towards human rights and 
individual liberties leave much to be desired, Russian cyber policy is an optimal example of a 
nation adapting to meet the challenges of a digitized world. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian people and the Russian government were poorly prepared for the information 
technology revolution, lacking both the skills the technology necessary to harness the power of 
cyberspace (Saunders, 2004). An economically and militarily weak Russia needed a plan to 
rebuild successfully and sustainably. Russia looked to the future, and committed itself to the 
domination of cyberspace. More importantly, the Russian government recognized the potential 
of cyberspace, and considered the threats residing there as secondary only to nuclear war 
(Thomas, 1996). 
In the cyber world, war is about gaining an information advantage over one’s opponent. 
This is done through disabling an opponent’s information and control systems, by crippling their 
ability to make decisions, and immobilizing the enemy’s ability to command the soldiers on the 
battlefield (Grau, 1996). The Russian military recognized the importance of understanding 
cyber-warfare technologies since the 1990s and has sought to prepare itself accordingly (Grau, 
1996). The military believed the successful use of computer viruses and other cyber-attacks 
could compensate for other military weaknesses such as a disadvantage in manpower and 
outdated weapons systems (Grau, 1996). More importantly, the military understood that this was 
the key to winning a conflict with the west should one ever occur. 
Russia has since made remarkable strides forward, as is evidenced by the rapid growth of 
Russian as a language on the internet from the 1990s to the early 2000s (Saunders, 2004). The 
increased online presence of the Russian population helped bolster the Russian economy, and 




continues building the Russian cyber community (Saunders, 2004). As a result, the largest 
number of computer hackers living in cyberspace now resides within Russia (Saunders, 2004). 
This rapid technical growth within Russia is the direct result of a serious commitment taken by 
the Russian Government. In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed The Doctrine of the 
Information Security of the Russian Federation (The Military Doctrine, 2010). This 
comprehensive plan to prepare Russia for the future, described the reconstruction of the digital 
infrastructure, and ways to train and equip Russian personnel to better understand information 
technologies (Doctrine, 2000). It committed the government to better understanding and utilizing 
these new technologies by both evaluating its own digital weaknesses and developing defenses 
within the next ten years (Doctrine, 2000). It also called for the creation of a new governmental 
entity responsible for monitoring and protecting the digital infrastructure through the creation of 
uniform policy (Doctrine, 2000). Additionally, it mandated security improvements to protect 
both the Russian financial sector and the military-industrial plants (Doctrine, 2000).  
 Russia currently has the best cyber-warriors on the planet, and the Russian government 
developed the best strategic sense on how to utilize to cyberspace as an effective tool during war. 
For years, Russia has been leading western nations significantly in cyber-war capabilities 
(Thomas, 2000). Hoping to duplicate this success, specifically those of Russian Naval Hackers, 
nations like China and North Korea began to develop similar education programs to prepare their 
militaries for cyber-warfare (Williams, 2009). This is done out of necessity, in the hopes of 
advancing their own military capabilities to replicate and repel the attacks of Russian hackers. 
 In the Russian military doctrine released in February of 2010, the government once again 
addressed cyber-warfare (The Military Doctrine, 2010). Russia acknowledged information 
warfare and cyber-attacks as an important part of warfare in the modern world, and announced 




its intention to use cyber-attacks as the first response to all political conflicts in an effort to 
prevent the use of traditional military forces (The Military Doctrine, 2010). Russia once again 
committed itself to further improve its information systems and technology, so that its military 
forces can better prepare for combat in this new world (The Military Doctrine, 2010). 
We are living in a dangerous new world. Threats which once only appeared in the pages 
of Ian Fleming novels and in science-fiction films now threaten our safety and security. In the 
20th century, the missile gap was a pillar of defense policy, because policy makers understood 
the consequences of inactivity. More importantly, policymakers were eager to prevent the 
nuclear war. As the United States enters the 21st century, cyber-security should be the major 
cornerstone of our new defense policy. Unfortunately, cyber-security has not become the security 
concern that it should be. While the threats of nuclear war are infinitely more petrifying than the 
threats of cyber-war, inadequate cyber-protection can lead to detrimental consequences 
(including attacks on nuclear launch systems). Without the development of a comprehensive and 
appropriate response to these growing threats, others nations and non-state actors will continue to 
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